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How Should Catholics Vote? 
Bringing Moral Principles to Life 
  
As a follow-up to Pope John Paul II’s encyclical Evangelium vitae 
(The Gospel of Life), the Bishops of the United States released, in 1998, a 
remarkable (yet little remarked) document entitled “Living the Gospel of 
Life: A Challenge to American Catholics.” In November of 2002, the 
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith published a “Doctrinal Note 
on some questions regarding the participation of Catholics in political 
life,” which, after a momentary flurry, also slipped to the back of people’s 
minds. These documents contain centuries of wisdom, not only practical 
but speculative, on the nature of participation in the life of our cities, 
regions and nations. Of particular interest is their statement of the 
principles which should govern the participation of citizens--both directly 
as lawmakers, and indirectly through their representatives--and the 
clear assertion of the primacy of the protection of human life, and of 
those rights and freedoms necessary to our living humanly. 
 
 Consider the following statements from these documents, 
statements which are extraordinary for their strength and clarity. First, 
from “Living the Gospel of Life”:  
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Opposition to abortion and euthanasia does not excuse 
indifference to those who suffer from poverty, violence and 
injustice. Any politics of human life must work to resist the 
violence of war and the scandal of capital punishment. Any politics 
of human dignity must seriously address issues of racism, poverty, 
hunger, employment, housing, and health care. Therefore, 
Catholics should eagerly involve themselves as advocates for the 
weak and marginalized in all these areas. Catholic public officials 
are obliged to address each of these issues as they seek to build 
consistent policies which promote respect for the human person at 
all stages of life. But being ‘right’ in such matters can never excuse 
a wrong choice regarding direct attacks on innocent human life. 
Indeed, the failure to protect and defend life in its most vulnerable 
stages renders suspect any claims to the rightness of positions in 
other matters affecting the poorest and least powerful of the 
human community. If we understand the human person as the 
“temple of the Holy Spirit”—the living house of God—then these 
latter issues fall logically into place as the crossbeams and walls of 
that house. All direct attacks on innocent human life, such as 
abortion and euthanasia, strike at the house’s foundation. These 
directly and immediately violate the human person’s most 
fundamental right—the right to life. Neglect of these issues is the 
equivalent of building our house on sand.1 
 
Next, from the Congregation’s “Doctrinal Note on some questions 
regarding the participation of Catholics in political life”: 
 
[A] well-formed Christian conscience does not permit one to vote 
for a political program or an individual law which contradicts the 
fundamental contents of faith and morals. The Christian faith is 
an integral unity, and thus it is incoherent to isolate some 
particular element to the detriment of the whole of Catholic 
doctrine. . . . When political activity comes up against moral 
principles that do not admit of exception, compromise or 
derogation, the Catholic commitment becomes more evident and 
laden with responsibility. In the face of fundamental and 
inalienable ethical demands, Christians must recognize that what 
is at stake is the essence of the moral law, which concerns the 
integral good of the human person. This is the case with laws 
concerning abortion and euthanasia . . . . Such laws must defend 
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the basic right to life from conception to natural death. In the 
same way, it is necessary to recall the duty to respect and protect 
the rights of the human embryo. Analogously, the family needs to 
be safeguarded and promoted, based on monogamous marriage 
between a man and a woman, and protected in its unity and 
stability in the face of modern laws on divorce: in no way can other 
forms of cohabitation be placed on the same level as marriage, nor 
can they receive legal recognition as such. The same is true for the 
freedom of parents regarding the education of their children; it is 
an inalienable right recognized by the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. In the same way, one must consider society’s 
protection of minors and freedom from modern forms of slavery 
(drug abuse and prostitution, for example). In addition, there is 
the right to religious freedom and the development of an economy 
that is at the service of the human person and of the common 
good, with respect for social justice, the principles of human 
solidarity and subsidiarity . . . .2 
 
 Despite such forceful statements, these matters have been a cause 
of deep division among Catholics. The fear, of course, is that the Church 
hierarchy might appear to be “telling Catholics how to vote.” Direct 
support for particular candidates would be troubling from a 
constitutional point of view, and problematic with respect to freedom of 
conscience. In trying to avoid the appearance of dictating votes, however, 
we must not be afraid to spell out the proper principles of action, even if 
doing so makes it obvious that certain candidates are beyond the pale. 
In this paper, I will attempt to do two things. First, I will attempt 
to ground the claims of these two documents in the constant teaching of 
the Magisterium, particularly as that is embodied in the social 
encyclicals of the popes from Leo XIII through John Paul II.  These are 
not ad hoc pronouncements, but the culmination of long and careful 
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thought on the nature of the human person, morality, law and the social 
order. Second, I will attempt to draw out the implications of this 
teaching for specific sorts of voting situations. People of good will, then, 
will have available to them a principled guide to a very important moral 
act. 
 
 I: The Duty of Catholic Participation 
 Christians have a moral duty to participate in the life of society in 
whatever manner is open to them. Christians are called to bring the 
Good News to the world, to evangelize the culture faithfully. “Christ’s 
redemptive work, while essentially concerned with the salvation of men, 
includes also the renewal of the whole temporal order. Hence the mission 
of the Church is not only to bring the message and grace of Christ to 
men, but also to penetrate and perfect the temporal order with the spirit 
of the Gospel.”3 Lay people, in particular, are called to shape the secular 
world.4 
In order to carry out this task faithfully, all Catholics have the 
responsibility to learn and understand the principles which apply.5 It is 
further our duty to live a consistent life, that is, to apply the moral 
principles of human action not just to one sphere of life, but to all 
spheres. There is in this regard no separation between public and 
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private, or between religious and secular.6 This is the case even in a 
pluralistic democracy like our own. John Paul II puts it this way: 
 
Nowadays there is a tendency to claim that agnosticism and 
skeptical relativism are the philosophy and the basic attitude 
which correspond to democratic forms of political life. . . . As 
history demonstrates, a democracy without values easily turns 
into open or thinly disguised totalitarianism.7 
Without ignoring the danger of fanaticism, we must admit that freedom 
can be attained only through respect for the truth. Since Jesus is “the 
Way, the Truth and the Life,” we cannot achieve the peace which all 
persons seek by means of law and government unless Christ and his 
Church enter into the life of society.8 
 If religion is not a purely private affair, then we are called to bring 
Christian principles to bear on our world wherever this is possible.9 One 
place where this is possible, and desirable, is the voting booth.10 The 
Catechism of the Catholic Church concludes, therefore, that "co-
responsibility for the common good make[s] it morally obligatory . . . to 
exercise the right to vote . . . ."11 
 If the state is operating legitimately in every respect, there will be 
no conflict of principles between the state and the Church. As history 
shows, this often has not been the case. If conflict arises between the 
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actions of the state or the policies of a political party, on the one hand, 
and Catholic teaching on faith and morals, on the other hand, it should 
be clear that one's proper path is to adhere to the faith.12 There is, of 
course, a distinction to be made here. We are not bound to a prudential 
decision or policy followed by Church officials when no basic principle of 
faith or morals is at stake.13 One may not, however, abandon Church 
teaching on matters of faith and morals for the sake of expediency. 
 Both John XXIII and Paul VI urged collaboration, where possible, 
between Catholics and non-Catholics on projects designed to bring about 
good ends desired by both groups. This cooperation is an important 
element in evangelizing the culture, bringing the Christian perspective 
to bear on society and politics. One might wonder, however, whether the 
second part of the message was ever heard: We must be extremely 
cautious about how we cooperate with those who do not share our 
religious and moral convictions. "[T]he Christian must make a wise and 
vigilant choice and avoid involving himself in collaboration without 
conditions and contrary to the principles of a true humanism, even in the 
name of a genuinely felt solidarity."14 A Catholic electorate, rightly eager 
to tackle such pressing social concerns as poverty and civil rights, joined 
wholeheartedly with others who, for entirely different reasons, sought 
the same goals. However, strong utilitarian and libertarian beliefs—
beliefs which are not compatible with a Catholic understanding of the 
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basic principles of human action—often drive the political agenda in this 
country. Without guidance from those who should have articulated the 
proper moral principles, Catholics all too often have adopted these false 
premises to support their political agendas. Later, when the time came 
to argue, for example, about abortion, the average Catholic no longer had 
the vocabulary for opposition to utilitarian and libertarian arguments, as 
a matter either of morality or law.15 Before entering into any specific 
arguments about voting, then, let us remind ourselves of that vocabulary 
by reviewing the Church’s teaching on the origins of, and relationship 
between, civil law and natural law. 
 
 II: The Source of Law 
 Almost everything the Church teaches regarding our 
responsibilities to state and society is grounded, not in revelation, but in 
natural law, "the law written in our hearts."16 Although we as Christians 
have the light of revelation to aid in this discovery, the natural law is 
accessible to reason alone. This means that the natural law applies to 
everyone, not just to believers.17 It seems strange, however, that 
something in our hearts is called “law.” Why does it make sense to call it 
this? 
 Law, in its most basic sense, is a plan of proper goals for the 
common good, and the means to attain those goals, which plan is 
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promulgated by someone in authority to those under his authority.18 
This, in essence, is how Thomas Aquinas, as part of an ongoing tradition, 
defines it. The ultimate authority is, of course, God who, as both reason 
and revelation tell us, is the Creator of everything. Since a Creator 
creates with a purpose, He establishes a goal, and the means to attain it, 
for every creature. The attainment of that goal constitutes the creature’s 
good, its fulfillment. In other words, God has in mind the Plan for every 
type of creature; this plan, therefore, is law, eternal law.  
 How does God promulgate this law? Most creatures, of course, 
cannot do otherwise than they do. To figure out God's plan for plants and 
animals, we need only to watch what they are naturally moved to do. 
Human beings, on the other hand, can freely reject God’s plan, but the 
way we discover the plan is the same: we consider those things towards 
which human beings are fundamentally inclined. This is what it means 
to say that the law is “written in our hearts.” The law we discover here is 
known as the natural law. 
 Those things toward which we are fundamentally inclined—for 
example, self-preservation, sexual intercourse and the care of offspring, 
knowledge of God and the world, love of others—point us to goals which 
are fundamentally worth pursuing—that is, to natural goods. What goes 
against these goods is unfitting to us, and must be avoided if we are to 
reach our fulfillment as human beings. That fulfillment is not to be 
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found in the pursuit of pleasure, power, money, fame or any ephemeral 
thing that we can have, but just as easily lose. Rather, our fulfillment 
lies in the excellent performance of the activities for which we were 
created: knowing and loving. Actions are right or wrong, not in their 
results, but in their relationship to this truth about human beings, to the 
human dignity of the one who acts and the one who is acted upon.19 
 How do eternal and natural law apply to “positive law,” that is, to 
ordinances established by a political authority? The natural law is “the 
obligatory point of reference for civil law itself.”20 There are those who 
argue that any ordinance that is made by a human authority demands 
our obedience, that the power of law comes simply from its being 
promulgated and enforced. Such a view is not a Catholic one. According 
to a natural law approach, the ordinance must be directed appropriately 
to a fitting goal, that is, one that is proper for human beings to pursue. 
No dictate of any authority that violates our God-given human nature 
makes sense. Indeed, an ordinance that violates the natural law is no 
law at all.21 Consequently, a government that enacts or enforces such a 
law is contradicting itself.  This is one way to understand the claim of 
Leo XIII that “a crime against religion is a sin against the State.”22  In 
other words, whatever in positive law violates the moral law is an attack 
not only against religion, but also against the very legitimacy of the 
state. For these reasons, it is our duty to resist such "laws."23 
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Correlatively, it is the duty of all rulers to rule in accordance with the 
natural law. For whatever the form of government, all power comes from 
God, and all proper authority derives from conformity with the natural 
law.24 
 
 III: The State Serves the Human Person 
 This understanding of law puts the relationship between human 
society and the state into proper perspective: the state itself makes sense 
only insofar as it serves us. It exists as a means to human perfection, 
and is at the service of the human person, the family, and the whole of 
society.25 It exists, in other words, to protect justice and the common 
good.26 One who has authority over a group must protect the goods of 
individuals in relation to each other, and the good of the group as a 
whole, the common good. In order to be legitimate, therefore, the state 
must do what it can to bring about the common conditions that enable 
human persons to attain fulfillment. By “fulfillment” we do not mean 
material well-being, although this is by no means inconsequential.  
Rather, “fulfillment” entails the achievement of human excellence—that 
is, a life of virtue.27 This being so, it is never legitimate for the state to 
support violations of the moral law by anyone, although occasionally it 
may permit some violations for a suitably grave reason.28 It is never 
legitimate for the state even to accept, let alone support, violations of 
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fundamental justice and rights. Since human beings precede the state, 
and are the reason for its existence, the state must, at the very least, 
attempt to protect us from violations of those fundamental rights 
without which we cannot move toward our proper end as human persons. 
“The chief concern of civil authorities must therefore be to ensure that 
these rights are recognized, respected, co-ordinated, defended and 
promoted, and that each individual is enabled to perform his duties more 
easily.”29 
All societies aim at peace. As Aquinas notes, peace has two 
elements: order and tranquility.30 Tranquility cannot be found without 
order. This requires that the demands of justice be met.31 True peace, the 
peace of Christ, must be a just one. But it is not simply justice; it is also 
charity.32 While justice removes the impediments to peace, it is 
completed through an act of self-giving love.33 Although the State can 
guarantee justice, it has not the authority to guarantee charity.34 
“Enforced charity” is a contradiction in terms. Nevertheless, human 
beings need the opportunity to exercise this virtue.35 Thus the State is 
required to smooth the path to charity through justice. True charity is 
best performed at the level of organization closest to the problem. This is 
because “needs are best understood and satisfied by people who are 
closest to them and who act as neighbors to those in need.” Indeed, 
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“certain kinds of demands often call for a response which is not simply 
material, but which is capable of perceiving the deeper human need.”36  
In performing its task of service to the person and society, the 
state must not overstep its authority. Thus it must be guided in its 
policies by the Principle of Subsidiarity. According to this principle, we 
must not assign to a higher level of association what subordinate 
organizations can accomplish.37 For example, the federal government 
should not do what can be accomplished at the state or local level; 
governmental organizations should not be responsible for what can be 
accomplished by private organizations and individuals. A violation of 
this principle constitutes "a grave evil and disturbance of right order," 
because it upends the relationship between society and state, putting 
persons at the service of the state.38 Improper interference in, or 
usurpation of, the proper responsibilities of those it exists to serve is 
completely at odds with the state’s reason for existence. For example, 
when a family is in deep economic distress, it may be right to help the 
family with public aid if no private aid is forthcoming; when it suffers 
from internal disturbance, it is right to intervene to safeguard the rights 
of individuals. But the state may go no further: "setting aside the parent 
and setting up a State supervision act[s] against natural justice, and 
destroy[s] the structure of the home."39 Admittedly, a large measure of 
prudence is necessary on the part of public authority. Under one set of 
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circumstances, a government program may appear to be the only 
workable solution to a particular social problem, while under somewhat 
different circumstances, it might seem an overextension. People of good 
will may reasonably disagree about the application of this principle in 
the particular circumstances, without disagreeing in principle. 
 
 IV: Fundamental Rights 
 What, then, is most fundamental to a properly ordered state? 
What is secondary? Which demands of justice and the common good are 
more important than others? 
 The State must recognize the right to certain freedoms and 
structures that are inseparable from the fulfillment of the human good. 
There are three that top the list--or, to use a metaphor of John Paul II, 
who is consistently eloquent on this subject, there are three which are at 
the center of a series of concentric circles of rights.40 “First and 
fundamental among these is the inviolable right to life of every innocent 
human being.”41  This is the right not to be assaulted in one's person by 
other persons, or by the state--except for the protection of the common 
good and justice, as in capital punishment and a justified war.42 Without 
this right in place, the logical principle at work is that either the state, or 
each individual, is free to decide who counts, and then act on that 
decision. A state that violates, or fails to enforce, this right acts in a 
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manner contrary to its own reason for existence, the protection of those 
under its authority. The logical outcome of this principle of action is 
either totalitarianism or anarchy. In either event, it is the triumph of the 
strong over the weak, of power over law, the elimination of society 
itself.43 “At that point, everything is negotiable, everything is open to 
bargaining; even the first of the fundamental rights, the right to life.”44 
So, any outcry on behalf of other human rights is simply false if the right 
to life is not maximally defended. This right anchors the very possibility 
of any other rights in the state.45  
 In the second ring are the basic human rights of the individual, 
primarily religious freedom and, implicit in this notion, freedom of 
thought and conscience.46 Our relationship with God is constitutive of 
individual existence, on the one hand, and essential to the structure of 
society, on the other.47 The point of human life is not ultimately to be 
found in this fallen world, but rather in God. A state which allows for, 
and assists in, the living of a moral life will help the individual fulfill his 
being and have something to show for his life when he is judged. In 
addition, every individual must have the ability to practice his faith 
freely in order to make living the moral life possible and to give it 
meaning.48 
 Also in this group of fundamental rights—one might arguably 
place it in this second ring along with religious freedom—there is the 
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right to the protection and support of the primary unit of society, the 
family.  
The first and fundamental structure for “human ecology” is the 
family, in which man receives his first formative ideas about truth 
and goodness, and learns what it means to love and to be loved, 
and thus what it actually means to be a person. Here we mean the 
family founded on marriage, in which the mutual gift of self by 
husband and wife creates an environment in which children can 
be born and develop their potentialities, become aware of their 
dignity and prepare to face their unique and individual destiny.49 
No other grouping of persons is as fundamentally important to human 
development as the “nuclear family” founded on the marriage of man and 
woman.50 Nor can any other person or institution other than the parents 
hold the primary responsibility for the education of children.51 Any 
attempts to undermine this reality--for example, the fostering of 
competing views of the institution of marriage, or the usurpation of 
parental rights and duties by the state--are, for that reason, assaults on 
the family, and therefore assaults on the good of both the individual and 
society itself.52 Thus the Council Fathers wrote: 
All those, therefore, who exercise influence over communities and 
social groups should work efficiently for the welfare of marriage 
and the family. Public authority should regard it as a sacred duty 
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to recognize, protect and promote their authentic nature, to shield 
public morality and to favor the prosperity of home life.53 
 As John Paul describes it, further circles of rights emanate from 
this center: civil rights, guaranteeing various individual freedoms 
helpful to human fulfillment; and political rights, enabling the citizen to 
engage in public affairs. He goes on to mention another ring of social and 
cultural rights, and a "third generation" of rights concerning human 
development and control of the environment.54 This metaphor of 
concentric rings of rights has not, to my knowledge, been worked out. 
The relation between the fundamental rights and further rights and 
freedoms certainly needs further exploration, which we can only begin 
here. It is, however, a potentially rich and useful metaphor. 
One aspect which makes the first three rights (life, religion, 
family) fundamental is the fact that they follow from the very definition 
of the human person, both as an individual and as a social being. They 
are rights without which a state cannot possibly be just, for without 
them, the state itself would be complicit in an assault upon the very 
beings it exists to serve.55  In other words, there are no circumstances 
under which a refusal of, or violation of, these rights is anything but an 
injustice, and thus a basic failure in the state’s use of authority. 
The second aspect which makes these three rights fundamental is 
that there is really only one way properly to instantiate them, and that is 
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fully and completely. In such matters, there is no room for prudential 
judgment about whether the conditions of justice have been met—no 
room, therefore, for people of good will to disagree. Failure to instantiate 
these rights is not simply a neutral lack, but an assault on both person 
and state. For example, the state must protect the lives of citizens from 
others. Any refusal to do so—as in abortion—entails a competing 
principle (i.e., that it is permisible for private citizens to kill one 
another), which is fundamentally at odds with the natural law 
understanding of both the person and the state. Similarly, the state must 
protect the freedoms of religious belief and practice in keeping with the 
natural law. Refusal to do so—as in outlawing the public display of 
religious symbols—entails a competing principle (i.e., that it is 
permissible for private citizens or the state to keep a person from his 
proper relationship with his Creator). In like manner, the state must 
protect the rights and welfare of the nuclear family as defined earlier. 
Refusals of, or violations of, this protection—as in the recognition of 
homosexual unions—entail the adoption of principles contradictory to 
the definition of marriage and family. 
We noted earlier that there are two possible times when the state 
may legitimately take human life: capital punishment and war. 
Following the natural law, the Church is not opposed to either of these 
tools of governance in themselves. She is, however, opposed to their 
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illegitimate use. In each case, however, the decision about whether any 
particular situation requires their use is a matter of prudential judgment 
on the part of those in authority.56 Naturally, the Church urges us to 
resist the use of these violent means if at all possible. However, people of 
good will can reasonably disagree about when the limits of forbearance 
have been reached. They are, of course, issues bearing on human life, but  
(as our opening quote from the U.S. Bishops makes clear) their 
legitimate use is not an issue of fundamantal right.57  
 
V: Relating Fundamental Rights to Subsidiary Rights 
The further rings of rights which follow from the first three (life, 
religion, family) have characteristics different from those of the first 
three. First of all,they make sense only when the first three have been 
acknowledged as fundamental. From the primacy of the nuclear family, 
for example, there follows the necessity of protecting the proper 
conditions for family life. The rights to these protections, therefore, 
precede the State.58 For example, human persons have a right to private 
property59; to earnings sufficient to support their families60; to the 
provision of as decent a level of health care as can be reasonably 
provided61; and to assistance when they are unable to provide for 
themselves.62 However, a right or claim to these goods—and subsequemt 
regulation by the state—makes sense only insofar as they serve the 
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fundamental three sets of rights—that is, insofar as they serve the 
proper ends of the human person.63 
 Secondly, the claim to such rights, unlike the fundamental three, 
can be meaningfully and truly satisfied in many ways. Charity, the 
principle of solidarity, and the universal destination of goods demand 
that we help others in need when we have an abundance of goods, but 
the state itself need not always provide the assistance.64 Indeed, the 
principle of subsidiarity assumes it will not do so except as a last 
resort.65 When it does, assistance may legitimately take place in many 
forms—a primary one being the creation of jobs.66 Health care is a right 
that is limited by the availability of resources, and may be administered 
in any number of just ways. What counts as a living wage depends to a 
great extent on cultural factors, like what the society counts as basic 
necessities, or who in the family is expected to contribute to the family's 
finances.67 The wage is not a concept applicable to the self-employed, so 
the right to support one’s family must be applied differently for such 
persons. And while private property is a necessity of human dignity, 
ownership of property may be regulated by the State in various ways for 
the sake of the common good.68 
 Many political rights are of the same character. Political rights 
enable the citizen to participate more fully in the life of the community. 
There are, however, many methods for doing so, and the Church is not 
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committed to any particular system.69 The task of the human person is to 
achieve his proper end, which is heaven. He may well do so within any 
political system. However, every state is constrained by the demands of 
justice: it may never violate the three sets of fundamental rights (life, 
religion, family), and it must establish the conditions which enable its 
citizens to carry out the duties which follow from his nature as a human 
individual, as a family member, and as a creature of God. 
 It is important to establish here the relationship of the outer rings 
of rights to the first three central ones. We could reasonably call them 
second and third level rights. The second level rights are those which are 
discoverable, because they follow logically from more fundamental rights 
grounded in human nature. For example, we have an natural right to 
private property, including productive property. This is grounded in the 
necessity that human beings provide for themselves and their families 
into the future.70 However, policies concerning ownership may promote 
the good of the person, and the family, and the common good of society, 
in more than one way. How the implementation of rights such as these 
best serves the good of the human person is a matter of prudential 
judgment. Thus, different people may have a difference of opinion over 
what property may be privately owned, or the conditions of such 
ownership. They may disagree over whether a particular tax is proper or 
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confiscatory. Even so, they may still agree in principle and aim at the 
accomplishment of the same good. 
Third level rights follow from the more central ones, not as logical 
consequences, but as useful means to the accomplishment of the good of 
the human person. These are rights in a somewhat different sense. The 
first and second level rights are natural rights which precede the state, 
and which may not be denied. For instance, one could claim a second 
level right to travel freely. One might want to say it leads logically to the 
right to drive a car. But what if I cannot afford a car, or am only twelve 
years old? What if no one is manufacturing cars? And if I may drive a 
car, may I drive it anywhere—on private property, or inside a building? 
May I drive at any speed I desire? The right to drive a car may follow 
from my right to travel freely, but there are reasonable limitations which 
may be placed on that right. For sufficient reason, I may even be denied 
the right to drive, without being able to claim that I have suffered harm, 
or even that it has impinged on my right to travel freely. 
 
VI: Some Intermediate Conclusions 
  How does all this information add up? Let’s connect the dots. 
What we know is that a state can support the three fundamental sets of 
rights in only one way—fully and completely—without employing 
contradictory principles. The second level rights are natural rights which 
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precede the state, but which may reasonably be implemented in a 
number of ways. The third level rights do not precede the state, but are 
recognized as rights only insofar as they are taken to be useful means for 
giving substance to the more fundamental rights. These, too, can be 
reasonably implemented in various ways. Thus, even when people of 
good will have acknowledged the subsidiary rights, there is room for 
disagreement as to how best to implement them. There will be, to use the 
common terms, more "conservative" or more "liberal" methods for trying 
to instantiate these rights, but in choosing one way over another, we are 
still aiming to bring about the good. The choice is strictly one of 
prudential judgment. 
 The social teaching of the Church since Leo XIII has been 
remarkable for its emphasis on these civil and political rights—for  
example, for its promotion of labor unions, or for its insistence on social 
institutions which reduce poverty. Two things should be noticed in this 
regard, however. First, the popes spoke to these concerns in situations 
where the protection of life, religious freedom, and the family were 
already assumed. Where these rights were threatened or absent, as in 
Nazi Germany or Communist China, they spoke forcefully about the 
most fundmental rights rather than the secondary ones.71 The Church 
recognizes that the subsidiary rights are rights only insofar as they serve 
what is fitting for human persons—and  in some circumstances human 
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persons and the common good are best served by a limitation of rights. 
The ownership of property, for example, is fundamentally necessary for 
the proper good of human individuals and families. Sometimes, however, 
the human good is better served by limiting that right—through 
taxation, for example, or the right of eminent domain. Political rights, 
like the right to vote, are useful to the full participation of the person in 
the life of the community, and therefore can be very good. While it would 
be unreasonable to deny the vote to people able to use it properly, it 
would not be unreasonble to deny it in circumstances where it would 
clearly hinder rather than promote the common good. On the other hand, 
no such argument can be made about the fundamental rights. Human 
fulfillment cannot be served if fundamental rights are violated; thus, the 
state must make every effort to protect them in full. 
 This, then, is the recipe for the common good. The life of the 
individual person must be protected from assault. Respect for conscience 
and religious worship must be ensured. The nuclear family as the 
fundamental unit of society must not be undermined in any way, but 
must be given special protection, more so even than other worthy social 
groups. Whatever else is necessary to the fulfillment of the human good, 
both individual and common, must be acknowledged and protected, after 
a prudent investigation of the different opinions on how these subsidiary 
rights would best be implemented in the current situation. The whole 
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plan must work toward one basic goal: the fulfillment of the human 
person. Lest there be any misunderstanding about what anchors 
everything, let me quote from a talk John Paul II gave at the end of his 
1987 visit to the United States: 
 
The best traditions of your land presume respect for those who 
cannot defend themselves. If you want equal justice for all and 
true freedom and lasting peace, then, America, defend life! All the 
great causes that are yours today will have meaning only to the 
extent that you guarantee the right to life and protect the human 
person: 
 -Feeding the poor and welcoming refugees. 
 -Reinforcing the social fabric of this nation. 
  -Promoting the true advancement of women. 
 -Securing the rights of minorities. 
 -Pursuing disarmament, while guaranteeing legitimate 
defense. 
All this will succeed only if respect for life and its protection by the 
law is granted to every human being from conception until natural 
death.72  
 
 VII: The Meaning of a Vote 
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 The principles outlined above should help Catholic voters identify 
the relative importance of certain social issues. But how are we to 
implement these principles? To answer this question, it is necessary to 
discuss the meaning of voting. 
 Most simply put, a vote is essentially a “yes” or “no,” acceptance or 
rejection, a statement of preference between two (or more) possible states 
of affairs. It is an act of making a choice, and is thus a deeply human act, 
one that fully involves our reason and our will. Because voting is such a 
fundamental statement of my choice, it is an intensely personal act. To 
vote in a way that is most fully human, I must vote freely and with full 
knowledge of what I am doing. In the public setting with which we are 
here concerned, my choice involves the good of human society; thus it is 
very clearly a moral act. Voting is therefore an act of conscience. It would 
not do, in my vote, to appeal to the freedom of other people to act 
according to their consciences. Here, I must act according to mine alone. 
Now one might explain a vote—whether it is concerned with small 
everyday things or larger matters of public policy—as essentially an act 
of self-interest. This would serve as an adequate explanation of voting 
only if human beings were, in the core of their being, purely self-
interested. Catholicism rejects such an idea of the human person. Self-
interest may, of course, be the motivating factor behind many actual 
votes. Our task, however, is to offer a justification for our votes. This 
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means we must ask what are the right reasons for a vote, so that we may 
act in a properly human way. 
 Since we are here considering society, government and law, let us 
confine our discussion to the ways we can vote with regard to these 
matters. If voting is properly an act of my conscience, then what I am 
trying to do when I vote is to bring into reality my vision of how the 
world ought to be. I must take into account everything that was stated 
above about what is a properly human vision  of society, government and 
law. That means that my vote must be an attempt to promote, not my 
private interests, but the common good. 
There are two kinds of votes I can cast: a) a direct vote (as an 
elected lawmaker, or as a citizen in a plebiscite) for or against a 
particular law or policy; or b) a vote for or against a person who will 
represent me, who will in turn be involved in making the laws. In the 
first type of vote, I attempt most directly to bring about my vision of the 
common good. Most of the time, however, I make use of the second type, 
election of a representative. 
 How am I to understand my vote for a representative? If I could  
elect a representative who would necessarily, in every instance, vote for 
exactly the public policies and laws I would vote for were I the legislator, 
then I could view the election as nothing more than putting into place a 
machine. Voting for this machine would be no different than voting on 
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the policy myself. Of course, candidates for public office are not 
machines. They are people with their own consciences, which they are 
obliged to follow. In other words, the best I can do is to vote for someone 
for office who will attempt to bring into reality his vision of the common 
good. The question then naturally arises: “Can I accept my 
representative’s vision of the common good?” I must be able to respond: 
“Yes, I can accept his vision (at least under the present circumstances), 
even if I cannot fully approve it.” Why does this matter? 
 Whether I vote directly for a law, or indirectly for a 
representative, I am cooperating in the actions of others. Because of this 
fact, my vote implicates me in their actions insofar as I am aware 
beforehand of the intentions of those whose actions my vote would 
authorize. If I act directly as a lawmaker by voting for a particular 
measure, I authorize citizens by law to perform certain actions. In order 
to do this morally, I must be able to accept these actions. Similarly, if I 
elect a representative to make the laws for us, I find his vision of reality 
acceptable, and authorize him to bring it about. Notice that my vote does 
not say that I like what the lawmaker stands for; rather it says that I 
find what he claims he will vote for, and the actions it authorizes, to be 
permissible given the circumstances, something I may accept and, by my 
vote, do accept. So, what are we to make of a situation in which the 
action to be authorized is evil? 
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VIII: Principles of Cooperation and Voting 
 According to the Catechism of the Catholic Church, we are 
responsible for our cooperation in the evil acts of others when we a) 
directly participate; b) order, advise, praise or approve; c) fail to disclose 
or hinder the evil when we have an obligation to do so; or d) protect evil-
doers.73 Any one of the last three situations is possible when we vote. 
May I cooperate in the evil acts of another? It depends. There are 
two kinds of cooperation. Formal cooperation is when I share in the 
intent of the person committing the evil action. The problem with 
sharing this intent is that I am therefore deliberately choosing the evil, 
which I may never do. Material cooperation, on the other hand, is 
offering assitance which makes the action possible, or easier. If I do this 
by direct participation in the act—that is, I actually do part of the job—I 
would, in essence, be sharing in the intent to do evil. However, if my 
material assistance is mediated, I may be able to do an act which is itself 
good or indifferent, which nonetheless has a bad outcome—that is, it 
supplies the means for a wrongful act—an outcome which I do not 
intend, but which I may accept under certain circumstances.74  
The principles of cooperation in an evil act are species of the 
principle of double effect. In order to be legitimate, there must be a 
proportionately serious reason for the cooperation--that is, the effect of 
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not cooperating is proportionately more harmful than cooperating. That 
proportion, between the harm done by cooperating as opposed to not 
cooperating, relies on two other factors. 
The first factor is the proximity of my cooperation to the evil act. 
The more remotely my action is connected to the evil act of the other 
person, the less closely I am implicated in his evil, and therefore the less 
grave need be the reason for my cooperation. A very proximate act of 
cooperation requires a quite serious reason: it is permitted only if it is 
necessary to avoid serious harm. A very remote cooperation requires a 
good, though less serious, reason. 
The second factor is the necessity of my own personal cooperation. 
My act is considered necessary if I am the only person whose cooperation 
will bring about the completion of the evil act. Such an act is permissible 
only if it is necessary to avoid some proportionately serious harm. If, on 
the other hand, others are available to perform the cooperative act, my 
act is deemed non-necessary. In this situation, since my lack of 
cooperation is not going to stop the evil act, then the reasons for 
cooperation need not be quite so serious. Cooperation which is both 
remote and non-necessary requires much less serious reasons to meet 
the requiremets of proportionality than cooperation which is both 
proximate and necessary. 
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Now how do I understand my vote in light of these principles? 
First of all, it is clear that my vote is never a direct participation in the 
evil or good acts of another. However, my cooperation may be objectively 
formal if the reason I vote to permit an evil is that I actually want to 
bring about that evil. Assuming this is not my intention, my cooperation 
would be material and mediate, and a judgment needs to be made about 
proximity, necessity and proportionality. 
Is a vote a proximate or remote cooperation? I would judge it to be 
proximate. Indeed, it seems it may be as near as one can get to an 
immediate cooperation in the act of another without actually crossing the 
line. Authorization by those in charge is absolutely necessary for evil 
actions to become permissible under positive law. In other words, such 
authorization is necessary to establish the rules in positive law which 
violate natural law principles. Of course, a vote for a representative who 
intends to authorize such actions is at least somewhat removed from the 
evil acts of citizens—but it is proximate to the evil acts of the 
representative. Without the votes which put him in office, he has no 
authority to proceed. 
Is my vote necessary to the completion of the evil act, or not? This 
is a bit trickier to establish. The typical examples in the literature on 
material cooperation involve the necessity of my cooperation, and no one 
else’s; cooperation is non-necessary when there are others equally 
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competent, and willing, to substitute for me. Votes of lawmakers, or 
votes for representatives, clearly do not work in this way; we are not 
talking about the act of replaceable functionaries. As we noted above, the 
vote is necessary to the completion of the evil, but the vote is usually not 
that of one person (just my vote, for example), but of the plurality or 
majority of a group (e.g., a legislature, or the voting public). “Necessary” 
must therefore be understood a bit differently here. Let us say that all 
eligible voters actually participate in a particular election, and that the 
candidate I vote for wins by one vote. Clearly, my vote is absolutely 
necessary for his victory. However, if my candidate wins by two votes, we 
might say that someone’s vote is not necessary—but whose?And what if 
not all eligible voters participate? The fact of the matter is, we do not 
know whether any particular vote is necessary or not until after the 
votes are counted. For this reason, I must enter each voting situation 
thinking that my vote has the potential to be the deciding vote—indeed, 
that my vote may be the only vote cast. At least from the point of view of 
the voter, then, every vote may well constitute a necessary cooperation in 
the actions of those whom my vote authorizes to act. However, I do not 
know this with certainty. Indeed, our experience is that this rarely 
happens. This leaves us with room for judgment. Precisely because I do 
not know whether my vote in this situation is absolutely necessary, a 
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certain amount of prudence is required to determine the likelihood that 
my vote will have such an impact. 
For these reasons, then, my vote should be viewed as proximate 
and, quite possibly, necessary to the acts of others; at the very least, I 
have no business assuming that my vote will not matter. Any 
cooperation in their evil acts may only be permitted for proportionate 
and extremely grave cause. 
 Now we have in place two sets of principles: a) a set 
demonstrating the seriousness of the goods or evils we might cooperate 
in by our vote, which enable us to analyze the proportion involved in 
such a decision (Sections I-VI); and b) a set explaining the circumstances 
under which it is legitimate to cooperate in another's actions, which in 
essence is what one does when one votes (Sections VII-VIII).  Two 
application questions arise, then: 1) How do these principles apply when 
a lawmaker votes to make laws? 2) How do these principles apply when 
we vote for our representatives? 
 
 IX: The Votes of Lawmakers 
 Those who make the laws must first of all have a proper vision of 
the state and its relation to the moral law; that is, they must realize that 
positive laws may never violate the moral law. So the lawmaker may not 
pursue a course of action supporting violations of the moral law. Politics 
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being the art of the possible, however, he may not be able to effect his 
vision without assistance from others, and this may mean compromise. 
The lawmaker must recognize, in this case, which values he may 
sacrifice, which values he may only compromise as a form of legitimate 
material cooperation, and which values he may not compromise at all. 
He must, therefore, be ready to act according to the hierarchy of rights 
outlined in sections III, IV and V. 
At the center of the hierarchy of rights (following John Paul II’s 
metaphor of concentric rings) is the right to life. In the next ring are the 
fundamental rights related to the individual (religious freedom) and 
society (the nuclear family). Another metaphor which might be useful is 
the arch: religious freedom and the family are the sides, with the right to 
life as the keystone. These three must all be respected--the first for the 
very possibility of society and state, the other two for the possibility of 
attaining our proper ends as human persons. The lawmaker who does 
not respect these rights is working against the good of society and the 
good of the person. Any assault on these rights is intrinsically wrong. 
 The next rings, of civil, political, social and economic rights, follow 
from the first three central ones. The secondary level natural rights 
follow logically from the central ones. Their existence precedes the state, 
though they can be instantiated in various ways. How the right is 
implemented depends on the circumstances of time and place, and is 
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thus subject to the prudential judgment of the lawmaker. But even if a 
legislator wished to limit these rights for immoral reasons, or worse, to 
deny them entirely, he would not commit so fundamental an assault 
against the state, society, or the person as he would by favoring an assault 
on the fundamental three sets of rights. 
 The third level rights follow from the more central ones as useful 
means to the accomplishment of the human good. They do not precede 
the state as such, though it might be unreasonable, even unjust, to deny 
a person a particular right under particular circumstances. These rights 
exist insofar as they have been implemented by lawful authority to serve 
more fundamental human rights and dignity. They may, of course, be 
instantiated in many different ways, as matters of prudence. Failure to 
provide these rights would not constitute an assault against the state or 
society, and would be a violation of the good of the person only insofar as 
their denial is unreasonable. 
 In Evangelium vitae 71-73, John Paul II is very clear about the 
duty of the legislator (i.e., my representative, or any one of us in a 
plebiscite) regarding the "first and fundamental" right, the "source of all 
other rights"--that is, the right to life. Disregard for this right "is what 
most directly conflicts with the possibility of achieving the common 
good." Our obligation to oppose abortion and euthanasia, and all direct 
assaults on innocent human life, is "grave and clear." He quotes the 
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Declaration on Procured Abortion (CDF, 1973): "In case of an 
intrinsically unjust law, such as a law permitting abortion or euthanasia, 
it is therefore never licit to obey it, or to 'take part in a propoganda 
campaign in favour of such a law, or vote for it.'" The Pope recognizes one 
small area of legitimate material cooperation in this regard: one may 
vote for a law which allows abortion or euthanasia only when it is not 
possible to get a complete victory, so as to limit harm. In doing so, one 
must avoid scandal by making clear one's opposition to the evil, and by 
explaining the reasons for the cooperation.75 This principle, it seems to 
me, applies as well to matters pertaining to religious freedom and the 
protection of the family structure.76 
 
 X: Voting for Elected Officials 
 There is not, to my knowledge, any document of the Church that 
has explicitly and fully applied these principles to citizens voting for 
their representatives, as she has to legislators. However, consistently 
applied, the principles show us a clear path to follow. Voting for a 
representative differs, of course, from voting directly for a law; one is not 
voting directly for a set of policies, but rather for a person. Reason insists 
that our government officials be good people, worthy of our trust. Since 
"legislation is the work of men invested with power," notes Leo XIII, 
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the quality of the laws depends more on the quality of these men 
than upon the form of power. The laws will be good or bad 
accordingly as the minds of the legislators are imbued with good 
or bad principles, and as they allow themselves to be guided by 
political prudence or by passion . . . . 77 
The test of the worthiness of a person for office, then, is wisdom. This is 
measured by the candidate’s relationship to the truth. Without wisdom, 
he is severely crippled in his ability to bring about the good. 
In this regard, we must be careful not to confuse wisdom with 
either high intelligence or sincerity. Too often, we are convinced that the 
person who demonstrates the highest intelligence quotient, as evidenced 
by an easy command of massive amounts of facts, numerous university 
degrees, or a capacity for witty repartee, is thus the obvious person for 
the job. This might be true were public office a merely technical position, 
and a public official's intellect merely a cog in the great governmental 
machine. Intellect in itself is neither virtuous nor vicious. It may be 
grounded in the truth, or it may not. Our public officials, however, must 
be men of virtue, in terms both of morality and of practical knowledge 
(the knowledge of our proper ends, and the means to attain them). True 
wisdom is not the same as intelligence or cleverness. 
As to sincerity, it is hard to say who is more dangerous: a) the 
person who, sincerely and with all his heart, believes that what is wrong 
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is right, and strives to bring about that evil; or b) the person who 
believes that what is wrong is right, but gives the appearance of 
believing the opposite. A person can appear sincere, without really being 
connected with the truth. Neither the hypocrite, nor the person who 
sincerely supports  what is objectively wrong, is grounded in the truth. 
On the other hand, we must take care not to confuse a candidate's 
apparent personal prejudices with his or her program for political action. 
For example, a person might let slip a racially dergoatory remark, 
though he never had performed, nor would ever intend to perform, a 
racially discriminatory act.  While those biases may be revealing, they 
reveal thoughtless habit more often than a considered relationship with 
the truth.78 
 What are we to say about a legislator who supports a regime of 
abortion and euthanasia, or who seeks by law to exclude any specifically 
religious points of view from public life, or who favors policies directly 
destructive of the family, such as sexual license or same sex "marriage," 
or forms of state control over the upbringing of children? We would have 
to say that such a person is not grounded in the truth about human 
beings, or about the relationship between morality and the law, or about 
the proper structure of the state. Such a person would favor policies 
which are directly at odds with our understanding of the most basic 
things necessary for human flourishing. 
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Now, I must ask myself, simply from a tactical point of view, why I 
would wish to elect to office a person so fundamentally at odds with my 
own vision of the good. It would seem rather foolish. Far more important 
than this tactical question, though, is whether I may morally support 
such a candidate. Remember that a vote for the candidate is a 
cooperation in his actions. Through my vote, I intend to put him in the 
position to bring about those policies he claims he wants to enact, both 
good and bad, both just and unjust. To justify my vote, I would have to 
say either a) that his policies are morally acceptable ones, or at the very 
least b) that there are proportionately serious reasons for putting up 
with the morally unacceptable policies he favors. 
 Obviously, it would be absolutely illegitimate to favor this 
candidate for office because of his support for laws which are evil or 
unjust, either intrinsically or situationally. This is formal cooperation, a 
sharing in the candidate’s evil intention. Could there, however, be a 
proportionately serious reason to vote for him or her? If what we noted 
earlier about my level of cooperation in the representative’s actions is 
correct, then we must employ the strictest standards here: there must be 
a proportionate and very serious reason for accepting such a candidate. 
We must use the hierarchy of rights to weigh the proportionate 
seriousness of the policies the candidate wishes to enact. 
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 Nothing is as important as the right to life. Allowing private 
citizens first to decide who counts, and then to act on that decision, is 
logically to advocate not the rule of law, but anarchy, the destruction of 
the state and society. Such a position, if acted upon, renders impossible 
the achievement of both the common good, and the good of the 
individuals killed. The bishops of the United States have been forceful in 
their call to Christians in this regard: 
The Gospel of Life must be proclaimed, and human life defended, 
in all places and all times. The arena for moral responsibility 
includes not only the halls of government, but the voting booth as 
well. Laws that permit abortion, euthanasia and assisted suicide 
are profoundly unjust, and we should work peacefully and 
tirelessly to oppose and change them. Because they are unjust 
they cannot bind citizens in conscience, be supported, acquiesced 
in, or recognized as valid. Our nation cannot countenance the 
continued existence in our society of such fundamental violations 
of human rights.79 
 Religious freedom and the protection of the family are next in 
seriousness. Without them, the state and society can exist, but citizens 
are substantially prevented from pursuing their proper ends as human 
beings. If the state fails to guarantee these rights, it is working to the 
detriment of those whom it exists to serve. 
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Second and third level rights have a situational aspect. In other 
words, policies designed to support (or limit) these rights are appropriate 
depending on whether or not they actually assist in bringing about the 
goods promised in the fundamental three. Failure to have these rights in 
place does not absolutely prevent us from attaining our proper human 
ends. However, that failure may substantively impair our pursuit of 
these ends (as in second level rights), or unreasonably deprive us of 
important means for attaining them (as in third level rights). While it is 
true that these civil, economic, and political rights do in fact promote the 
good of the individual and the family, we must remember that many of 
these rights can be achieved  in various and equally permissible ways. 
Thus, one candidate may support universal health care, another 
completely privatized health care, and both would be pursuing the same 
good in permissible ways. These are issues of prudential judgment, not of 
fundamental justice. So, while I might disagree with a particular policy 
as a matter of prudence, I may still accept that policy. 
 The last category of policies would have to do, not with rights, but 
with the positive laws which are conducive to public order and 
organization. Examples would be traffic laws, and ordinances requiring 
residents to shovel the sidewalk when it snows. Whatever laws are 
reasonable and do not fail in justice are permissible. 
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 How do I use this information in the voting booth? In any election 
there are at least two candidates from which to choose. Of course, if 
there is one candidate with whom I completely agree, I will have no 
difficulty deciding for whom to vote. In reality, however, it is rarely that 
simple. Usually, I disagree with every candidate about something. In 
making a choice, the question becomes one of the proportionate moral 
seriousness of the policies over which we disagree—that is, of the 
proportionate seriousness of the candidate's connection (or failure to 
connect) with the truth. Each ring of rights raises a set of issues on 
completely different levels. Policies concerned with rights in the outer 
rings only incidentally involve justice issues—that is, they are just or 
unjust based on accidental circumstances. These policies are always 
outweighed by policies concerning rights in the inner rings, which 
inherently entail rights and justice. The right to life is proportionately 
far more serious than all the others, since it is the anchor for all other 
rights. 
 
 XI: Some Applications 
 It should be useful to try to apply these principles to some concrete 
(albeit hypothetical) situations. I have included here some situations 
which I have actually encountered, some which I have created to test the 
theory, and some suggested to me by critical readers. While I believe 
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that these applications follow from principles stated and emphasized in 
Church teaching, it is well to note that they go beyond what is explicitly 
contained in doctrinal statements.  
Suppose we have two candidates, Mr. A and Ms. B. Let us suppose 
that, in terms of the outer rings of rights and their implementation, you 
and Mr. A could not be more completely in agreement. In your best 
judgment, Mr. A's plans regarding distribution of health care, the 
minimum wage, welfare, social security, unions, education funding, 
affirmative action, the treatment of criminals, and national security, are 
all, in your opinion, exactly right. Ms. B, however, has an approach to 
these issues with which, as a matter of prudential judgment, you 
strongly disagree. The difficulty you find, however, is that Mr. A is in 
favor of opening the definition of "marriage" to include relationships 
other than that of one man and one woman. Ms. B, on the other hand, is 
opposed to such changes. 
One might argue that we ought not get too caught up in this one 
issue, and few of us wish to be thought of as "single issue" voters. 
However, this one issue completely outweighs all the others mentioned. 
It involves an issue of fundamental justice and the good of the basic 
social unit, the family. It would be more proper to call it a "singular 
issue."80 Mr. A's position on marriage is one which may not be morally 
taken. The other issues as outlined here are matters of prudence; one 
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could be on either side of the debate, and still be holding a morally 
permissible position. As it stands Mr. A has a plan to support, along with 
some good things, something intrinsically evil. Ms. B is supporting the 
same good things--though by different means--and also intends to use 
her actions to defeat this intrinsic evil. And even if some of Ms. B’s 
proposed policies were, in fact, contrary to justice, they would not attack 
the good of human persons and society fundmentally, as do Mr. A’s 
proposals. 
 What reason might be put forward for supporting Mr. A over Ms. 
B? The most likely reason would be that, given the two candidates' 
programs, it would do more harm than good to support Ms. B. This, 
however, supposes some sort of parity between the issues involved. But 
we have shown that there is no parity. The evil that Mr. A intends to 
support is on a completely different level. A vote for Mr. A is a form of 
cooperation in his proposed actions. In order to vote for him, I would 
have to either a) intend the good or evil he intends—which I do not—or 
b) have a proportionately serious reason for materially cooperating in his 
evil. But there is no proportionately serious reason for supporting Mr. A. 
Thus, to support him would constitute an objectively grave evil. 
 What if Mr. A is running, not against Ms. B, but rather against 
Mr. C, who is not only in favor of homosexual marriage, but also 
legalized prostitution and a special tax on all church-related schools. In 
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this case, I have a choice between bad and proportionately worse. Now I 
can make a case for material cooperation with Mr. A, because the evil 
Mr. C plans to bring about is more serious than the evil Mr. A supports. 
Thus, I could vote for Mr. A, provided I do not share in his evil intent, 
but only intend the good he plans, and I look to replace him in the next 
election with someone who does not support these evils. 
 Here is an intriguing election possibility. Ms. A favors abortion 
rights across the board. Mr. B favors most abortion rights, but is against 
partial birth abortion and would like to see parental notification laws. 
Both of these candidates are running strong in the polls. Mr. C, on the 
other hand, is fully opposed to abortion and euthanasia and embryonic 
stem cell research, but is only making a three percent showing in the 
polls. In other words, Mr. C is the best candidate, but it is highly 
unlikely that he will be elected. Must one vote for Mr. C? I think the 
answer is no; I might reasonably choose Mr. B under the circumstances. 
I appeal here to the principle of material cooperation for the lawmaker in 
Evangelium vitae 73, mentioned above in Section VIII: one may vote for 
a law which allows abortion or euthanasia only when it is not possible to 
get a complete victory, so as to limit harm. I believe the same principle 
may be applicable in this instance to the case of voting for a 
representative. The intention involved in voting for Mr. B over Mr. C is 
not to approve of Mr. B’s policies in their own right, but to perform an act 
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which has the best chance of limiting the proportionately serious harm 
which might otherwise be done by Ms. A. It must be clear, as before, that 
I will vote against Mr. B if that option is reasonably available. 
 Many people (I have a number of friends among them) who are 
morally opposed to abortion, euthanasia, embryonic stem cell research 
and the like, nonetheless consistently vote for legislators and executives 
who support these things. They use the following reasoning: “Prolife 
candidate P is in no position to change the situation. She will have little 
chance to bring or sign any legislation this term. Neither will prochoice 
candidate Q. However, Q will be in a position to help enact other 
important legislation which I support. Therefore I will vote for candidate 
Q.” This argument sounds intriguingly similar to our last situation. 
However, I think there are important differences. 
 First, in the previous case, I would be voting to limit the harm 
against life already in place, which would be furthered by Ms. A. That 
principle of limiting the harm does not apply to the situation of 
candidates P and Q. Here, the argument is to abandon the cause of life 
entirely, so as to effect other goods—far less important goods. Second, 
one has to wonder what the basis is for assuming that candidate P will 
not be able to effect her legislation, while candidate Q will be able to 
effect his. Is it because there are clearly far more votes on the prodeath 
side than the prolife side? Is it because candidate P is a neophyte, while 
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candidate Q is a veteran legislator? All the more reason to get candidate 
P into office, so that he can help change the balance, and become an 
effective leader. Perhaps nothing will change this term—but what about 
next term? We should all remember well the lessons of partial birth 
abortion legislation in Washington. Twice it passed through Congress, 
only to be rejected by President Clinton. The third time through, 
President Bush signed it into law. But it would never have reached 
either president’s desk if we had refused to elect legislators to office 
because “it was unlikely to pass.” 
 Throughout our deliberations prior to an election, we must always 
remember the hierarchy of values. There is no right with a higher value 
than the right to life. A candidate who favors abortion or euthanasia 
must be rejected unless the opposing candidates are even more pro-
abortion or pro-euthanasia. A candidate who supports abortion through 
all nine months is worse than one who only wants abortion legal in the 
first trimester; a candidate who supports abortion for any reason is 
worse than one who supports it only in tragic circumstances. A candidate 
who supports both abortion and euthanasia is worse than one who 
supports only one. A candidate who wants to keep parents out of the 
abortion decisions of their minor children not only supports abortion, but 
also acts which are destructive of the family. But these are differences 
only of degree within the innermost ring.  The point we have been 
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striving to make is that the distinction between circles is one of kind; 
there is no proportionality between one ring and another. 
 One may be tempted to blur the distinctions between circles when 
the circles are adjoining. Say, for example, that candidate X supports 
abortion on demand, but is opposed to homosexual unions. Candidate Y, 
however, is strongly prolife, but just as strongly in favor of homosexual 
unions. Let us further say that they would represent a strongly pro-
abortion, and increasingly pro-homosexual, state. Do I have to go with 
candidate Y over candidate X? Will prudence allow the abandonment of 
the higher, more central value in favor of the lesser, but still very 
important, value? We must ask the same questions as before: On what 
basis are we convinced that the abortion fight is beyond hope, but the 
marriage fight is not? On what basis are we convinced that candidate X 
will have an influence, but candidate Y will have none? If either issue 
could be identified as based on a principle the application of which people 
of good will could disagree about, the answer would be easy. As it stands, 
it is difficult for me to see how the less central value of the family—
important as it is—can be proportionate to the most central value of life, 
even if there appears to be a better chance of making the law concerning 
the lesser value better. 
 These sorts of problems in application (and others like them) are 
important in that they force us to face the difficulties in applying general 
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principles to concrete situations. On the other hand, how likely is it that 
we will face a scenario like the last one? Is it not far more likely that a 
candidate will be either consistently in favor of traditional views on life, 
religion and family, or consistently opposed to those traditional 
positions? This will usually be the case, because these issues are 
connected in a coherent vision of the person, morality, law and 
government. 
 In light of this observation, let me make one last argument, 
perhaps the most daring one of this paper. So important are these 
principles in our decisions about whom to elect to office, that I believe 
they should be applied to every candidate for public office—for instance, 
to city council—even if his office has no direct connection to the making 
of laws concerning these fundamental rights. Every public official should 
have to take a public stand on questions of life, religion and family, for in 
doing so he reveals his underlying vision of person, morality, law and 
government. Unless his office is that of a mere functionary, which can be 
filled by anyone with technical expertise, the candidate will have to bring 
his wisdom to bear on the common good in the execution of that office. 
This vision—this wisdom, or lack thereof—is by this fact the single most 
important qualification for holding public office. As a practical point, 
even when the office in question has very little direct influence on these 
“inner ring” issues of fundamental rights, every election raises that 
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official just a bit higher in public stature, and thus in the ability to assert 
his leadership, for good or ill, through increased power. We voters should 
never pretend that these issues sometimes do not matter in an election. 
They always matter. 
 
XII: Conclusion 
If there is a head to this article, it is the intellectual and spiritual 
argumentation laid out by one hundred and twenty-five years of social 
encyclicals. If there is a heart to this article, it is the plea to act, and to 
act in particular ways. Let me close by returning, one last time, to 
“Living the Gospel of Life,” for I can think of no better way to sum up the 
heart of this article than the following words: 
We encourage all citizens, particularly Catholics, to embrace their 
citizenship not merely as a duty and privilege, but as an 
opportunity meaningfully to participate in building the culture of 
life. Every voice matters in the public forum. Every vote counts. 
Every act of responsible citizenship is an exercise of significant 
individual power. We must exercise that power in ways that 
defend human life, especially those of God’s children who are 
unborn, disabled or otherwise vulnerable. We get the public 
officials we deserve. Their virtue—or lack thereof—is a judgment 
not only on them, but on us. Because of this, we urge our fellow 
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citizens to see beyond party politics, to analyze campaign rhetoric 
critically, and to choose their political leaders according to 
principle, not party affiliation or mere self-interest.81 
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